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ABSTRACT 
Federal agencies regulate many products and activities that impact the safety of 
children. Agencies should put a premium on saving the lives of children when 
analyzing the costs and benefits of proposed regulations. This note uses original 
evidence from the infant car seat market to determine that a child-specific benefit 
measure should be one and a half to two times that of an adult. A child premium will 
encourage more regulations that protect the safety of our society’s most precious and 
innocent members. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
n 1996, Anton Skeen was riding in a sport utility vehicle with his 
mother when the vehicle was involved in a rollover accident.1 Four-
year-old Anton, who was wearing a lap-and-shoulder seatbelt, slipped 
out of his seatbelt, was ejected from the vehicle, and died.2 In 2002, 
Congress passed “Anton’s Law,” requiring the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) to develop rules for child 
restraint systems that could prevent children from being ejected from 
vehicles.3 In 2003, NHTSA promulgated a rule based on Anton’s Law, 
regulating child restraint systems for children up to sixty-five pounds.4 
The NHTSA rule saves an estimated thirty-four children per year by 
keeping children like Anton secured in booster seats during collisions.5 
In 2011, NHTSA proposed a rule that regulates restraint systems for 
children up to eighty pounds that could save many more children each 
year.6 
This note argues that agencies can better reflect society’s desire to 
protect the innocent by passing more rules to save children. Some rules 
would be targeted at child safety in everyday activities, like Anton 
riding in a vehicle with his mother. Other rules would be targeted at 
child safety in rare events, like terrorist attacks and mass shootings. A 
tragic shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, Connecticut, 
                                                 
1 Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Anton’s Law Mandates 




3 Anton’s Law, Pub. L. No. 107-318, 116 Stat. 2772 (2002) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 30127 (2002) (ordering NHTSA to regulate child restraint systems)). 
4 See Child Restraint Systems, 49 C.F.R. § 571.213 (2003) (setting standards for 
booster seats for children up to sixty-five pounds). 
5 See OFFICE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS, NHTSA, FMVSS No. 213, 225, FINAL 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS, CHILD RESTRAINT 
ANCHORAGE SYSTEMS (1999) [hereinafter NHTSA], available at http://www
.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/rulings/UCRA-OMB-J08/Econ/RegEval.213.225.html. 
6 Child Restraint Systems, 76 Fed. Reg. 55825 (proposed Sept. 9, 2011) (requiring 
booster seat manufacturers to ensure that their products are safe for use by 
children up to eighty pounds); see also Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: 
Child Restraint Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 51720, 51729 (2005) (initiating 
rulemaking to establish regulations on restraint systems for children up to 80 
pounds). 
I 
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on December 14, 2012, killed twenty first-grade students.7 At a prayer 
vigil following the event, President Obama said, “This is our first task, 
caring for our children. It’s our first job. If we don’t get that right, we 
don’t get anything right. That’s how, as a society, we will be judged.”8 
I argue that a first step to better caring for our children is to ensure that 
agencies are placing the proper focus on child safety. 
This argument is not based on the idea that more regulation is 
always desirable, but instead that agencies should shift more focus to 
regulations that promote child safety. Child-safety regulations can be 
promoted through the existing regulatory framework in which 
economic analysis plays a central role.9 Specifically, a benefit measure 
that puts a premium on children’s safety can prompt agencies to shift 
more focus to child-safety regulations. The desire for a child premium 
and how to use the benefit measure in economic analysis have been 
expressed in executive orders and agency guidance, but there is a gap 
in the literature as to what the benefit measure should be. This note 
surveys the landscape of economic analysis in rulemaking before 
turning to the difficult questions of what the child premium should be 
and how to justify it. In short, evidence of parent willingness to pay a 
premium for the safety of children supports a benefit measure for 
children that is larger than benefit measures that are derived from adult 
choices about their own safety. 
Executive Order 12,866, issued by President Clinton in 1993 and 
substantially retained by every President since, requires agencies to 
weigh the expected benefits of proposed regulations against the 
expected costs.10 Quantifying costs and benefits of regulations can be 
                                                 
7 Joseph Berger, Facing the Unendurable, Families Lay to Rest Two Children, 
Both 6, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19
/nyregion/more-funerals-held-in-newtown-after-massacre.html. 
8 President Obama’s Speech at Prayer Vigil for Newtown Shooting Victims (Full 
Transcript), WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com
/2012-12-16/politics/35864241_1_prayer-vigil-first-responders-newtown. 
9 See infra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
10 See Exec. Order No. 12, 866, sec. 1, 58 C.F.R. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (“Federal 
agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory 
alternatives . . . ”). The requirement applies to any “significant regulatory 
action,” which the order defines as regulations that are expected to have an 
“annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.” Id. sec. 3(f)(1). This 
definition includes each of the regulations used as examples in this note. 
Executive Order 12,866 was largely based on Executive Order 12291, signed by 
President Reagan in 1981. See 46 Fed. Reg. 13193. 
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difficult, and the methods selected can have large impacts on whether 
proposed rules are estimated to have positive net benefits.11 The White 
House Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) reviews proposed 
regulations and can reject promulgation of a regulation for many 
reasons, including disapproval of an agency’s benefit-cost analysis 
methodology or dissatisfaction with the result of the analysis.12 The 
NHTSA is unlikely to move forward with the proposed rule on child 
restraint systems if the regulation is not expected to produce a net 
benefit based on a sound benefit-cost analysis.13 With OMB acting as a 
gatekeeper to rule promulgation based largely on economic analysis, 
the regulation of child restraint systems will be determined largely by 
how NHTSA measures benefits and costs.14 If OMB rejects NHTSA’s 
implementation of Anton’s Law because the net benefit estimate of the 
regulation is “too low,” children will continue to be ejected from 
vehicles and killed. Although calculation of child safety benefits may 
seem an esoteric and morbid topic, children’s lives depend on the cost 
and benefit estimates that are used in economic analyses. 
In 1997, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,045 
requiring every federal executive agency “ensure that its policies, 
programs, activities, and standards address disproportionate risks to 
children that result from environmental health risks or safety risks.”15 
As part of the OMB review process, agencies must separate safety 
risks to children from the risks to the general population.16 Executive 
Order 13,045 reflects society’s feeling that children are special, but 
stops short of requiring agencies to use a separate benefit measure for 
                                                 
11 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
CIRCULAR A-4, at 3 (2003) (“Different regulations may call for different 
emphases in the analysis, depending on the nature and complexity of the 
regulatory issues and the sensitivity of the benefit and cost estimates to the key 
assumptions.”). 
12 See generally Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review of 
Environmental Policy: The Potential Role of Health-Health Analysis 8 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 111 (1994) (discussing benefit-cost analysis of regulations). 
13 See id. at 114. 
14 See id. at 112–13 (discussing health-health analysis as an alternative way to 
approach costs and benefits in regulatory review); see also FAQ, OFFICE OF 
INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2013). 
15 Exec. Order No. 13,045, sec. 1-101(b), 62 Fed. Reg. 19885 (Apr. 21, 1997). 
16 Id. at sec. 1-101(a). 
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improved safety of children.17 President Clinton stopped short of 
mandating child-specific benefit measures because of a lack of studies 
on what the child-specific measures should be.18 
In the wake of Executive Order 13,045, scientists and economists 
have turned increased attention to how safety regulations impact 
children and how society values the safety improvements.19 The 
Children’s Health Valuation Handbook, published by the 
Environmental Protection Agency in 2003, provides guidance to 
agencies such as the NHTSA engaged in benefit-cost analysis of 
proposed regulations that impact child safety.20 Society appears to 
value child safety differently from adult safety, so the Handbook 
recommends that agencies use child-specific benefit measures.21 
Instead, agencies currently use benefit measures for adults to estimate 
the value of improved safety to everyone, including children.22 
Agencies cite a lack of studies measuring the benefits of improved 
child safety as the main reason they do not use child-specific benefit 
measures.23 This note helps to fill that gap. 
The federal government regulates many activities and products that 
impact the safety of children. For example, the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) sets standards for baby food to ensure that 
infants receive the nutrients they need with products that meet exacting 
quality controls.24 The Consumer Product Safety Commission 
regulates products such as toys, cribs, and strollers to ensure that they 
do not pose undue risks to children.25 There are also regulations that 
impact broader populations, but have concentrated effects on young 
people. For example, the EPA regulates lead due to its toxicity and has 
                                                 
17 See id. at sec. 1-101 (“Children’s behavior patterns may make them more 
susceptible to accidents because they are less able to protect themselves.”). 
18 See id. at sec. 3-301 (creating a task force to develop research on child-specific 
risks). 
19 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (“EPA”), CHILDREN’S HEALTH VALUATION 
HANDBOOK 1-1 (2003) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (surveying scientific and 
economic studies of child health valuation). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 2–6. 
22 Id. at 2–5. 
23 Id. 
24 See 21 U.S.C. § 350a(1) (2006) (authorizing the FDA to inspect infant formula). 
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 2056a (2008) (authorizing the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission to regulate consumer products including toys and cribs). 
270 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 264 
banned lead paint from being used in situations where children would 
be exposed because children are especially sensitive to lead toxicity.26 
These are just a few examples of the many federal regulations that are 
designed to increase safety levels for children.27 
The social desire to protect children, as expressed in Executive 
Order 13,045 and the best practices outlined in the Handbook suggest 
a premium on child safety as compared to adults, which conflicts with 
the current agency practice of using an adult benefit measure for 
children.28 This note argues that agencies should indeed put a premium 
on saving the lives of children when analyzing the benefits and costs 
of regulations. A premium on children’s lives will make regulations 
that focus on child safety, such as NHTSA’s implementation of 
Anton’s Law, more likely to pass a benefit-cost analysis and become 
law. This note is the first to combine market evidence of what people 
are willing to pay for child safety with a practical method for agencies 
to implement a child-specific benefit measure. By following the 
roadmap in this note, agencies can quickly implement safety 
regulations that better comport with the law and, most importantly, 
prevent innocent children from dying. 
The note proceeds with Section II providing background on federal 
regulations and a review of why and how benefits and costs of 
regulations are measured. Section III sets out theoretical justifications 
for a child premium on benefits; children have long life expectancies 
with expected increases in their standards of living and are not at fault 
for the risks they face because they are not in a position to make 
informed life-and-death decisions. Section IV considers market-based 
evidence that parents are willing to pay more for child safety than 
adult safety as a justification for the child premium. Original empirical 
evidence from the infant car seat market, supported by existing 
evidence from the baby food market, provides agencies with a 
rationale for valuing the life of a child at one and a half to two times 
that of an adult. Section V provides agencies with a roadmap for 
implementing the child premium with a multiplier on the lives of 
children expected to be saved by regulations. Section VI concludes 
                                                 
26 See 40 C.F.R. § 745(L) (2006E) (2008) (EPA rule banning lead in most 
residential homes under authority of Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act, 
which added Title IV to Toxic Substances Control Act). 
27 See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text; see also 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (2004) 
(setting national standards for low-level ozone). 
28 See HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 1-1 to 1-2. 
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that more child safety is normatively desirable and discusses 
alternative methods of achieving this increased safety level. 
II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CHILD SAFETY REGULATIONS 
This section surveys federal safety regulations, paying special 
attention to rules that impact child safety. Examples of safety 
regulations show the broad scope of regulation in the United States 
and introduces the products that will be used as the basis for market 
evidence discussed in Section IV. Since regulatory analysis often 
involves the use of economic tools, the note briefly discusses market 
justifications for the existence of regulation in the first place. This 
includes discussions of the costs and benefits of increased safety as 
well as rationale and application of benefit-cost analysis to regulations. 
This discussion of the economic analysis of regulations sets the stage 
for why a child premium is needed and justified. 
A. Regulations that Impact Safety 
Many statutes and regulations are intended to improve safety.29 For 
example, NHTSA sets a wide array of standards for seatbelts, airbags, 
and structural panels of vehicles to ensure that these features meet 
minimum safety levels and consumers can trust that new vehicles will 
be reasonably safe.30 NHTSA regulations play an important role in 
ensuring that vehicles are safe, but stringent regulations also lead to 
higher vehicle prices.31 The tradeoff between price and safety in 
vehicle travel will be further explored in Section IV. 
Other agencies also act to improve safety.32 For example, the FDA 
regulates pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and food to promote our 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 655–677 (2006) 
(authorizing the creation of the Occupational Safety & Health Agency to create 
rules to improve safety in the workplace); Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–
965 (2006) (mandating mine safety). 
30 See Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (2006) (authorizing the 
Secretary of Transportation to create safety standards for motor vehicles). 
31 See Bill Vlasic, U.S. Sets Higher Fuel Efficiency Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
28, 2102, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/business/energy-
environment/obama-unveils-tighter-fuel-efficiency-standards.html (quoting the 
Secretary of Transportation as estimating that more stringent fuel economy 
standards would lead to price increases of $2000 to $3000 per vehicle). 
32 See infra notes 38 and 39. 
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health and wellness.33 The FDA approves pharmaceuticals for the 
market only after onerous testing procedures.34 The FDA also 
regulates most food to ensure that it will meet certain quality criteria.35 
Federal regulation of food can help solve an asymmetric information 
problem.36 Unsafe food is often hard to distinguish from healthy food 
before it is eaten, and since consumers eat a wide array of foods, it 
would be difficult to distinguish which food caused illness after it has 
been eaten.37 Evidence of consumer willingness to pay for safety in the 
food market will be examined in Section IV. 
Consider also the EPA regulation of air under the Clean Air Act, 
water under the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act, or 
toxic substances under a number of other acts.38 The goals of these 
acts include promotion of human health and environmental quality.39 
Regulators traditionally focus on the human health benefits of 
regulation, so they are most concerned with environmental issues that 
impact human health and welfare.40 Environmental regulations are 
usually motivated by the classic market failures associated with public 
goods, and often impact large populations.41 The broad scope of the 
                                                 
33 See 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2006) (authorizing the FDA to regulate pharmaceuticals 
and food). 
34 See id. § 355(b)(1)(A) (requiring proponents of new drugs to submit 
investigations of a drug’s safety and effectiveness as part of its application for 
introduction to the public). 
35 Id. § 393(2)(A); see also Mission Statement, THE U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE 
(“USDA”), http
://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=MISSION_STATEMENT.h
tm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (also regulates food for similar reasons.); 21 
U.S.C. § 602 (2006) (authorizing the USDA to regulate meat products because it 
is “essential in the public interest that the health and welfare of consumers be 
protected.”). 
36 See David A. Hennessy, Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry 
Vertical Integration, 78 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 1034, 1035 (1996) (explaining 
that asymmetric information refers to situations in which one party knows more 
than the other parties involved). 
37 Id. at 1036. 
38 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(1–7) (2006); Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) 
(2006). 
39 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). 
40 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 114 (6th ed. 2009). 
41 Public goods are things that are non-excludable and non-rival, meaning that it is 
difficult to prevent others from using the good and one person’s use of the thing 
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environmental issues regulated by the EPA shows that the health and 
safety of every person living in the United States is impacted by 
regulations.42 
Some regulations focus on the safety of children in particular.43 
NHTSA recommends that children under twenty-two pounds sit in 
rear-facing car seats, and children under sixty-five pounds use restraint 
systems, which are most commonly car seats or booster seats.44 
Parents who fail to follow these rules are subject to state traffic laws, 
with fines ranging from $10 to $500.45 For new car seats to be sold in 
the United States, they must be approved by NHTSA.46 NHTSA 
requires a new infant car seat to have a five-point harness, use the 
Lower Anchors and Tethers for Children (“LATCH”) anchor system, 
and pass a series of crash tests.47 The five-point harness attaches to the 
seat at five places and is more effective than a traditional three-point 
                                                                                                                   
does not prevent another person from using it. See id. at 162. Public goods are 
classically associated with a market failure of under-provision, since producers 
have a difficult time charging people for their use. Id. In extreme cases, such as 
the air around us, there is a total lack of a market. See id. 
42 See Our Mission and What We Do, EPA, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.epa.gov
/aboutepa/whatwedo.html (describing the EPA’s purpose as, among other 
things, to “ensure that all Americans are protected from significant risks to 
human health and the environment where they live, learn and work,” and to 
accomplish that mission they “develop and enforce regulations.”). 
43 See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2057c(d)(3)(B) 
(2006) (authorizing the Consumer Product Safety Commission to set regulations 
banning lead in children’s toys). 
44 MELISSA A. SAVAGE ET AL., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
PROTECTING CHILDREN: A GUIDE TO CHILD TRAFFIC SAFETY LAWS 6 (2002). 
45 See Child Passenger Safety Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOC., (Oct. 
2012), http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/childsafety_laws.html (setting 
out state fines for child safety violations). The lowest fine for not having your 
child in an appropriate restraint system is $10 in Michigan. Id. Nevada has the 
highest at $500. Id. 
46 Child Restraint Systems, 49 C.F.R. § 571.213.S5(a)–(c) (2003). 
47 See Lower Anchors and Tethers for Children (LATCH) Restraint System, 
NHTSA, (2012) http://www.nhtsa.gov/safety/latch; Nat’l Highway Trans. Safety 
Occupant Crash Protection, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 at S4.1.2.2 (2003) (requiring 
five-point harness); Child Restraint Anchorage Systems, 49 C.F.R. § 571.225 
(requiring most new vehicles to have the LATCH system and specifying crash 
test parameters). 
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seatbelt at keeping the child in the seat.48 The LATCH system uses 
straps and buckles to make the seat itself less likely to move than if it 
were strapped down with a traditional seatbelt.49 Front and rear crash 
tests ensure that the seat can retain and protect a child in low and mid 
speed crashes.50 More recently, Congress has charged NHTSA with 
the task of “minimizing head injuries from side impact collisions,” 
which NHTSA is currently studying.51 In the interim period while 
NHTSA is studying the issue, some car seat producers have already 
started offering side impact protection in car seats. Consumer 
willingness to pay for side impact protection will be the source of this 
note’s original market evidence that parents are willing to pay a 
premium for the safety of children. 
Another regulation impacting child safety is the FDA’s regulation 
of baby food to ensure that parents can be confident that the foods on 
the store shelves will be reasonably safe for their children.52 The FDA 
requires baby food processors to test their products and facilities for a 
range of pathogens and toxic substances.53 When there is reason to 
suspect a tainted product, the FDA has authority to require the 
producer to recall the product.54 These safety measures increase the 
costs of producing baby food.55 Much of this increased cost is passed 
on to consumers, especially since demand for a product like baby food 
                                                 
48 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.225 at S1 (2003) (describing the purpose of the LATCH 
requirement as “to increase the likelihood that child restraints are properly 
secured and thus more fully achieve their potential effectiveness”). 
49 See Nat’l Highway Trans. Safety Administration, Lower Anchors and Tethers 
for Children (LATCH) Restraint System (2012) http://www.nhtsa.gov/Safety
/LATCH. 
50 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 at S2 (2003). 
51 Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act, 
sec. 14, Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1806 (2000) (codified as amended at 49 
U.S.C. §§ 30127). 
52 See 21 U.S.C. § 350a (2006) (outlining requirements for nutrient content, quality 
control, and recall of infant formula). 
53 Id. at § 350a(b)(2). 
54 Id. at § 350a(e)(1)(B). 
55 See FDA, SUPPORTING STATEMENT FOR INFANT FORMULA RECALL 
REGULATIONS 6 (estimating manufacturer cost per recall of $758,240 for 
information sharing requirements).This is only a small piece of the expected cost 
of recalls, which is only one of the expected costs that are prompted by FDA 
regulations. Id. 
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is relatively insensitive to changes in price.56 This note surveys 
existing research measuring willingness to pay a premium for safer 
baby food to support the empirical results from the child car seat data. 
Many EPA regulations significantly impact child safety. Young 
children are especially susceptible to many kinds of pollutant 
exposure. For example, exposure to heavy metals like mercury and 
lead is especially toxic to fetuses and young children.57 The Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) have a target blood level 
of lead of ten micro-grams per liter (µg/L) or less for children because 
this concentration appears to be a threshold above which adverse 
health effects appear.58 The threshold for adults, who are more resilient 
to lead exposure, is twenty-five µg/L.59 
Because of children’s increased sensitivity to lead, the EPA bases 
its lead standards largely on how children will be impacted.60 In 1973, 
the EPA promulgated a finding that lead was dangerous to human 
health and safety after studies showed that lead impaired cognitive 
development in children.61 This finding was followed by a rule that 
phased out the use of lead as an additive in gasoline.62 Based on more 
scientific evidence of lead’s toxicity, the EPA classified lead as a 
criteria air pollutant under the Clean Air Act, which led to regulation 
of other sources of airborne lead.63 Children are also exposed to lead 
                                                 
56 When consumers are relatively insensitive to changes in price, economists call 
demand for the product inelastic; when producers face an inelastic demand, they 
are able to pass along the majority of cost increases in the form of higher prices 
without seeing a large corresponding drop in the quantity purchased. W. KIP 
VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 210–12 (4th ed. 
2005). 
57 See 40 C.F.R. § 141.86 (2010) (setting out requirements for water systems to 
lower lead and copper levels in drinking water to prevent harm to children). 
58 Lead, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (“CDC”), (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www
.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/. 
59 CDC, Adult Blood Lead Epidemiology and Surveillance-United States 2008–
2009, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, vol. 60 no. 25 at 841 
(2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6025a2
.htm. 
60 See Exec. Order No. 13,045, sec. 1-101, 62 Fed. Reg. 19885 (Apr. 21, 1997). 
61 See 40 C.F.R. § 80.1(a) (2002) (limiting the amount of lead allowed in gasoline 
because of health concerns). 
62 Id. at § 80.22(b). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2006). 
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through drinking water.64 In 1986, the EPA started regulating lead 
under the Safe Drinking Water Act.65 The EPA’s regulation of lead 
demonstrates how safety regulations that are largely driven by concern 
for children can have far-reaching impacts on broader populations. 
The above discussion of safety regulations gives a picture of the 
broad scope of regulations that aim to correct market failures and 
protect the population of the United States. By focusing on a few of 
these regulations that are targeted towards children, this note suggests 
that people care deeply about the safety of children and are willing to 
pay a premium for it. This finding has implications for a broad range 
of regulations that impact everyone in the United States. In order to set 
the stage for why and how to better promote child safety, this note 
turns next to a discussion of the role of economic analysis in agency 
rulemaking. 
B. Costs and Benefits of Safety Regulations 
When an agency is setting a safety regulation, it has the difficult 
decision of determining the appropriate level of safety. Determining 
the appropriate level of safety can be difficult because there are 
tradeoffs to safety in the form of higher product prices, less consumer 
choice, and increased burdens on industry.66 For example, should 
NHTSA require car seats to be made of a safe, but expensive, 
polymer? If car seats made of this polymer would cost several hundred 
dollars and would be unaffordable for many families, the answer may 
be no. The agency has to determine the appropriate balance between 
safety and the costs of that safety.67 Economic theory suggests that a 
regulation that is a response to a market failure, such as information 
asymmetry or lack of a market, is more likely to pass a balancing of 
costs and benefits.68 
Occasionally, Congress has mandated a particular safety level that 
regulators must strive to reach.69 Consider, for example, the Delaney 
                                                 
64 S. Triantafyllidou et al., Lead Exposure Through Drinking Water: Lessons to be 
Learned from Recent U.S. Experience, 11 GLOBAL NEST J. 341 (2009). 
65 42 U.S.C. § 300g-6 (2012). 
66 HANDBOOK, supra note 19 at 22. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 4. 
69 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 
1663–67 (2001) (surveying statutes with mandated safety levels). 
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Clause, which says that zero artificial carcinogens should be allowed 
as additives in food products.70 In this case, the FDA must either 
follow the statutory mandate, leading to over-regulation, or follow a 
more sensible course fraught with political risk.71 If the FDA chooses 
to allow a non-zero amount of artificial carcinogens as food additives, 
it could face judicial challenges or budget cuts.72 Most statutory 
mandates, however, leave a good deal of discretion to agencies to 
determine the “reasonable” or “justifiable” level of safety.73 
When so directed by Congress, how can an agency determine what 
is a reasonable or justifiable level of safety? And if there are multiple 
safety levels that are reasonable, which level should the agency 
choose? Executive Order 12,866 instructs agencies to use economic 
analysis to review major federal regulations.74 Major regulations are 
defined as those that have an expected impact of more than $100 
million per year.75 Agencies must submit proposed regulations to the 
OMB, which has authority to reject proposed rules or require 
amendment or additional analysis by the agency; because of OMB 
review, economic analysis often plays a central role in determining a 
regulation’s reasonableness.76 
In 2003, the OMB issued Circular A-4, containing guidance on 
how the economic analysis should be performed.77 Circular A-4 lays 
out the preferred form of economic analysis called the benefit-cost 
analysis, which compares the expected benefits of the regulation with 
                                                 
70 Id. at 1663–64 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1994)). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1655 n.17. 
73 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006) (instructing EPA to limit use of substances 
when there is a “reasonable risk”); 42 U.S.C. § 2167(d)(1)–(3) (2006) 
(justifiable risk). 
74 Exec. Order No. 12, 866, sec. 1(a), 58 C.F.R. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
75 Id. sec. 3(f)(1). 
76 Id. sec. 2(b). The OMB has authority to reject rules proposed by executive 
agencies like those mentioned in this note. Independent agencies such as the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB”) are not subject to binding review by the OMB, although they 
are required to report their regulatory activities. See id. Although this note 
discusses review by the OMB, economic analysis is handled by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, a division of the OMB. Id. 
77 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
CIRCULAR A-4, at 2 (2003). 
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the expected costs.78 Agencies are supposed to look at a range of 
alternatives to see which alternative provides the largest net benefit.79 
For safety regulations, this can be instructive in determining how 
stringently to regulate potential risks of bodily harm.80 If the regulation 
has a positive net benefit, the agency has an argument that the safety 
level is reasonable.81 The safety level of the alternative that leads to 
the highest net benefit might be considered the best alternative, 
although agencies can, and often do, deviate from this alternative for 
reasons such as politics, uncertainty, and institutional constraints.82 
Costs in a benefit-cost analysis are usually calculated by adding the 
predicted burden on industry and regulatory costs.83 Although these 
numbers are not always easy to estimate, agency analysts and outside 
consultants usually work with the affected industry to figure out how 
production and sales will be impacted, then work with the agency to 
predict costs of implementation and enforcement.84 To come up with 
these numbers, information from the market can often be used directly, 
such as the difference in prices between goods that have and lack the 
safety feature, or indirectly, such as agency official wages multiplied 
by the expected hours spent on the rule.85 
C. Measuring Benefits of Regulations that Impact Safety 
The benefits of safety regulations are often more difficult to 
measure and quantify than the costs of regulations.86 It is hard to 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 10. 
81 Id. at 28. 
82 Id. at 10. 
83 Id. at 2. 
84 Id. at 3. 
85 Id. at 21–22. For a critique of this methodology and suggestions for 
improvement, see William A. Pizer & Raymond Kopp, Calculating the Costs of 
Environmental Regulation (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 03-06, 
(2003). Pizer and Kopp explain the standard agency process for calculating costs 
as a collaborative effort with industry and the agency. Id. They argue that this 
process gives industry incentives to provide exaggerated estimates and makes 
the agency decision prone to undue influence from industry. Id. They 
recommend improving the process by having more independent research done 
by outside consultants. Id. 
86 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
CIRCULAR A-4, at 18 (2003). 
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quantify the value of things like health and clean air that are not traded 
in markets.87 The methods outlined below use art and science to try to 
measure how much people value particular aspects of safety compared 
with other goods and services. Scholars and professionals use market 
evidence and surveys to estimate the benefits of safety regulations. 
This note turns to these methodologies in Section IV to estimate a 
child premium. 
A widespread methodology starts by quantifying the change in 
health outcomes due to the safety regulation.88 For example, regulation 
of lead in drinking water was expected to prevent 30,000 children 
annually from exceeding the maximum recommended level of lead in 
their blood.89 The decrease in exposure was predicted to prevent 
cognitive development problems that would have decreased 
intelligence and later required remedial education.90 This type of 
estimate is usually the result of a series of studies that look at the dose-
response relationship between the regulated substance and various 
exposed populations.91 
After a change in health outcomes has been quantified, the agency 
must convert this benefit to dollars if it wants to compare the benefits 
of the regulation to the costs.92 This step is especially difficult and 
controversial as people tend to be averse to the idea of putting a 
monetary value on things that are seen as intensely personal and even 
sacred.93 How much is it worth to avoid a case of chronic bronchitis or 
a premature death from respiratory failure? When dealing with 
regulatory policy, which inevitably impacts a large population, it is 
important to remember that the monetization of a prevented case of 
bronchitis or premature fatality is not for a specific person, but rather a 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 40, at 202 (describing benefit-cost analysis of 
lead regulation). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 204. 
91 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HUMAN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT: DOSE-
RESPONSE ASSESSMENT (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/risk
_assessment/dose-response.htm. 
92 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
CIRCULAR A-4, at 2 (2003). 
93 See VIVIANA ZELIZER. PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL 
VALUE OF CHILDREN 148 (2001) (arguing that putting an implicit price on the 
life of a child is immoral). 
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small change in probability for everyone in the impacted population.94 
A life of an actual person may well be considered priceless,95 but small 
changes in the probability of fatality are part of everyday life 
whenever someone makes a decision of whether to get into a car, take 
medication, or eat a hamburger.96 Monetizing these changes in 
probabilities is not the same as putting a dollar value on the life of a 
particular human.97 
OMB Circular A-4 requires agencies to make the difficult 
quantification of how much people value a change in health or safety 
whenever possible.98 The preferred method for quantifying the dollar 
impact of changes in health outcomes is to use market-based estimates 
of people’s willingness to pay (“WTP”) to avoid the negative health 
outcome.99 The Handbook explains that WTP is the theoretically 
preferred starting point for measuring benefits because “individuals are 
best suited to judge for themselves the value of goods or services.”100 
For example, if a consumer is willing to spend an extra four dollars to 
avoid a one in one hundred chance of contracting the flu, the implicit 
value of averting a case of the flu is $400. When averaged across a 
sample of the population, these WTP values for risk reduction are 
indicative of the safety versus cost tradeoff that matches the 
population’s preferences.101 As long as those WTP values are based on 
informed decision-making, a responsive government agency should 
choose regulations that match those preferences.102 
If there is no market evidence available for estimating WTP, 
agencies can use evidence from stated-preference studies.103 Stated-
preference studies use surveys to ask people hypothetical questions 
                                                 
94 W.KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR 
RISK 84 (1992). 
95 ZELIZER, supra note 93, at 147. 
96 VISCUSI, supra note 94, at 19. 
97 Id. at 20. 
98 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
CIRCULAR A-4, at 29 (2003). 
99 Id. 
100 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 2-6. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 2-6 to 2-7. 
103 Id. at 2-7. Stated-preference studies are also called contingent valuation studies. 
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about their preferences.104 For example, after receiving information 
about the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker, I may be asked how 
much I am willing to pay to help protect ten nesting pairs of these 
woodpeckers.105 Stated preferences are generally considered less 
reliable than market data because respondents do not have clear, strong 
incentives to give truthful responses about how they feel.106 If I believe 
this survey is going to be used to set policy and I prefer more 
conservation, I may act strategically and say that I would pay 
$1,000,000 to protect the woodpeckers. Since I do not really pay the 
amount of my response and “put my money where my mouth is,” there 
is not the same check on responses as there is in market situations 
where people are actually paying to enact their preferences.107 
The bulk of studies looking at monetization of health benefits 
focus on the value of preventing fatalities, called the value of a 
statistical life (“VSL”).108 VSL is usually based on how much people 
are willing to pay for a small change in the probability of death.109 If 
everyone in a city of one million people were willing to pay $10 to 
prevent an unknown one of those million people from dying, that 
would lead to a VSL estimate of $10 million.110 The majority of VSL 
studies use data from the labor market to see how much workers must 
be paid to take a job that has a risk of fatality.111 Labor economists call 
extra pay to tolerate an undesirable attribute of a job a compensating 
                                                 
104 Id. at 4-6. 
105 See REPORT OF THE NOAA PANEL ON CONTINGENT VALUATION (May 9, 2001) 
available at 58 Fed. Reg. 4601, 4603–04 (recommending best practices for 
stated-preference studies). This example uses an open-ended question about 
WTP. Most stated-preference studies actually have a closed-ended format, 
which is found to be more reliable. 
106 Id. at 4605. 
107 Id. at 4610. 
108 VISCUSI, supra note 94, at 19. Agencies are also interested in the non-fatal 
health and safety effects of regulation. For a variety of reasons, it tends to be 
much more difficult to get reliable evidence for WTP for non-fatal outcomes. 
See Richard Zeckhauser, Measuring Risks and Benefits of Food Safety 
Decisions, 38 VAND. L. REV. 539, 545 (1985) (describing tradeoffs of health 
risks and the difficulties in quantifying these tradeoffs). 
109 VISCUSI, supra note 94, at 19. 
110 To calculate this value, take the average willingness-to-pay of $10, multiplied 
by the change in risk of one per million = $10 million. 
111 W. Kip Viscusi, The Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life: Introduction 
and Overview, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1, 7 (2010). 
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differential.112 These labor market studies tend to show that workers 
demand compensating differentials that lead to VSL estimates around 
$7 million.113 For example, for a worker to be indifferent between a 
completely safe job and a similar job with an annual fatality risk of 
one in ten-thousand he would require an additional $0.35 per hour to 
work the risky job.114 Professors Aldy and Viscusi show that VSL 
estimates from labor market studies result in an inverted U-shape when 
VSL is plotted over a range of worker ages, meaning that VSL 
estimates start low for young workers, increase to a maximum around 
forty-five years old, then decrease slowly for older workers.115 The 
VSL has increased with time as income has risen, with an estimate of 
$4.6 million in 1984, and a current estimate of $7.4 million.116 
Although most studies are based on information from the labor 
market, there are also VSL estimates that result from consumer 
product markets for things like medicine and bicycle helmets.117 These 
studies look at how much consumers are willing to pay for safety 
features in products. A benefit of consumer product studies is that they 
can provide VSL estimates for populations that are not in the labor 
market.118 Another alternative is to use stated-preference surveys to 
                                                 
112 VISCUSI, supra note 94, at 34. 
113 W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical 
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
5, 18 (2003). 
114 See id. at 19–21. To calculate this compensating differential, $7 million VSL 
multiplied by .0001 (the change in probability that a fatal accident will happen) 
divided by 2000 hours per year, equals $.35 per hour. This assumes that workers 
know that there is a change in risk and work forty hours per week for fifty weeks 
per year. These assumptions are standard in the literature. Id. at 55. 
115 Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for 
Age and Cohort Effects, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 573, 573–74 (2008). 
116 Mortality Risk Valuation, EPA (2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf
/pages/MortalityRiskValuation.html. Other agencies have seen similar increases 
in their VSL estimates over this time period. Id. These values have been 
adjusted for inflation to a common unit of 2006 dollars. Id. 
117 See Glenn C. Blomquist et al., Willingness to Pay for Improving Fatality Risks 
and Asthma Symptoms: Values for Children and Adults of All Ages, 33 RES. & 
ENERGY ECON. 410, 410–11 (2011) (estimating VSL from willingness to pay for 
asthma medicine); Robin R. Jenkins et al., Valuing Reduced Risks to Children: 
The Case of Bicycle Safety Helmets, 19 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 397, 400 (2001) 
(estimating VLS from data on bicycle helmet usage). 
118 Id. 
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compute a VSL.119 Regulators in the United Kingdom tend to use 
stated preference studies to estimate VSL.120 
With a measure of the value of a change in health or safety in 
hand, an agency can multiply the estimated impact of the regulation on 
health or safety by the value measure.121 For example, a regulation of 
workplace safety that is expected to save ten workers per year would 
have an expected benefit of $74 million using a VSL of $7.4 
million.122 The EPA used this methodology to predict that decreasing 
exposure to airborne lead yields health benefits of $236 million per 
year, $193 million of which come from reducing children’s 
exposure.123 Later studies found that this prediction probably 
underestimated the true benefits of reducing lead exposure.124 The 
EPA predicted that reducing lead in drinking water would generate 
$2.8 billion in annual benefits, with $2.2 billion coming from a 
decrease in damage to children’s cognitive development.125 
The above examples give a sense for why it is important to 
accurately estimate society’s desire to balance the tradeoff between 
safety and cost. When the desire for safety is overestimated, 
consumers face restricted choices and pay higher prices for marginal 
increases in safety. When the desire for safety is underestimated, 
unsafe products or conditions are allowed to continue despite society’s 
willingness to pay for increased safety. As the next section explains, 
agencies currently underestimate society’s desire for child safety 
regulations. Fortunately, correcting the estimate can be done within the 
existing regulatory analysis framework by implementing a child 
premium when measuring benefits of safety. 
                                                 
119 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
CIRCULAR A-4, at 22 (2003). 
120 See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 113 at 56–57. 
121 LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, ET AL.,THE REGULATORY STATE 484 (2010). 
122 Ten workers saved per year multiplied by VSL of $7.4 million = $74 million. 
123 EPA, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE 13 (Mar. 1984). 
124 See Joel Schwartz, Societal Benefits of Reducing Lead Exposure, 66 ENVTL. 
RES. 105, 117 (1994) (describing the unexpected benefit of lower blood pressure 
with reduced lead exposure). 
125 See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS ADDENDUM: PROPOSED CHANGES TO 
NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS FOR LEAD AND COPPER 5 
(1996) (anticipating costs and benefits of reducing lead and copper in drinking 
water). 
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III. A CHILD PREMIUM: THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
Estimation of the benefits of improved child safety poses unique 
challenges.126 Children depend on parents or guardians for support, so 
they do not regularly make autonomous decisions that can be used as 
market evidence of willingness to pay.127 Children are not in the labor 
market, so compensating differentials cannot be used to estimate a 
VSL.128 Children do not regularly make purchasing decisions on 
consumer products involving safety that could provide evidence of a 
WTP for safety.129 Even if children did make these decisions, there 
would be doubts about what this evidence would mean.130 Children 
have not fully developed their cognitive abilities, including the parts of 
the brain that process risky decisions.131 Regulations aim to set safety 
levels that are reasonable based on WTP, but if decision-makers are 
not rational, then it is unclear what their decisions reveal.132 It may 
well be that society wishes to increase the safety of children, even if 
those children may not make that choice for themselves.133 For 
example, a ten-year-old boy may be perfectly willing to ride on a roller 
coaster of dubious safety, but his parents, and society in general, 
probably wish to prevent him from doing so. 
The EPA’s Children’s Health Valuation Handbook serves as a 
guide for measuring benefits of regulations that impact child safety.134 
The Handbook is not legally binding but is instead meant to serve as 
guidance for the EPA and other federal agencies that are performing 
cost-benefit analyses.135 The most common current approach is to 
measure benefits of child safety using a VSL calculated from adult 
                                                 
126 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 1-6. 




131 Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision 
Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCH. SCI. IN 
THE PUB. INTEREST 1, 29 (2006). 
132 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 2-7. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1-1. 
135 Id. at 1-3. 
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data.136 The Handbook provides advice on how adult VSL could be 
adjusted for use with children.137 However, this practice is uncommon. 
Essentially, agencies currently regard all lives saved by regulation as 
equal.138 Although there is a simple moral appeal to this idea, there are 
several reasons we may say there is something special about saving the 
lives of children.139 Children and adults play very different roles in 
society.140 Children engage in special activities and generally have less 
responsibility than adults.141 These differences might well prompt us to 
value benefits to children differently. 
A. Long Life Expectancy 
One of the obvious differences between children and adults is age: 
children are younger than adults. From a 2012 perspective, a three-
year-old child born in 2009 would be expected to live for 75 more 
years.142 A twenty-year-old adult born in 1992 has a life expectancy of 
56 more years.143 A forty-year-old born in 1962 can be expected to 
live another 30 years.144 The precise value of a saved life depends on 
the characteristics of the life saved.145 A young person has a longer life 
expectancy, so in some respects, regulations that save children offer 
more bang for the buck.146 As medical technology continues to 
improve, we hope and expect that life expectancy at birth will continue 
to rise in the future. 
                                                 
136 Id. at 3-12. 
137 Id. at 2-13–14. 
138 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 205, 206 (2004). 
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B. Innocence of Children 
A second reason we may wish to put a premium on children’s lives 
is that children are often thought of as blameless. Young children, 
especially infants, have not made life choices that put themselves or 
others at risk of harm. The law recognizes the doctrine of “assumption 
of risk” for adults who choose to engage in activity that has high 
inherent risks.147 This same doctrine does not apply to children in like 
manner because children are different.148 Children have not fully 
developed their decision-making abilities.149 They have fewer 
experiences and less knowledge to draw on when making a 
decision.150 Often they lack the authority to make the decision in the 
first place.151 Although people tend to think of children as curious and 
mischievous, people also think of them as innocent when it comes to 
life-threatening situations. The theory is that some adults, whether 
parents or tortfeasors, should have prevented the child from being 
harmed. 
This sense of innocence could transfer from the tort realm to the 
regulatory realm. Children have not made choices to emit lead into the 
air, allow dangerous bacteria into processed food, or drive recklessly. 
Some adults have made these choices, and our society has come up 
with mechanisms for how to regulate, deter, and punish that behavior. 
Perhaps, as a society, we wish to see extra regulation, deterrence, and 
punishment when children’s lives are at stake. 
IV. A CHILD PREMIUM: EMPIRICAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
The Handbook asks for empirical evidence to support the 
theoretical arguments for a premium on child safety regulations.152 
Empirical support can show that people in society are already making 
                                                 
147 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A(1965) (general rule); Id. at 
§ 496D cmt. c. (“If by reason of age, or lack of information, experience, 
intelligence, or judgment, the plaintiff does not understand the risk involved in a 
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148 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (noting that a children’s 
standard of conduct in negligence actions is different from that of adults). 
149 Reyna & Farley, supra note 131, at 20. 
150 Id. 
151 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 2-7. 
152 Id. at 1-1. 
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choices consistent with a premium on children’s lives.153 As 
mentioned above, it is difficult to get evidence for constructing a child 
VSL from either the labor market or from purchases by children.154 
Instead of using evidence from children’s decisions, this note follows 
the recommendation of the Handbook to use evidence of their parents’ 
willingness to pay.155 Parent WTP seems like a reasonable proxy for 
child WTP because parents are usually the ones making safety 
decisions in the market for their children.156 If parents are willing to 
pay more for the safety of their children than for themselves, that is 
evidence that they put a premium on the lives of children. Although 
there is a special relationship between parents and children that 
impacts WTP for safety, that does not dilute the value of market 
evidence for use in a VSL calculation.157 The Handbook describes the 
theoretically preferred basis for VSL calculations as individuals’ WTP 
for their own safety, and clearly there is a special relationship between 
the purchaser and beneficent in that situation.158 Parent WTP, in lieu of 
unavailable or undesirable child WTP, seems like the most appropriate 
gauge for society’s preferences for child safety. 
A. Original Evidence: Car Seats 
This note contributes to the literature by collecting original data to 
estimate a VSL for children. Parent WTP for additional safety in a 
particular product market can give a sense of our society’s preferences 
for the appropriate tradeoff between safety and cost. Agencies should 
use these estimates when considering proposed rules so government 
regulations will reflect what people in the United States consider to be 
the appropriate level of safety. 
The car seat market is one place where parents make purchases 
that have implications for the safety of their children. As mentioned 
above, NHTSA requires car seats to have certain safety features that 
                                                 
153 Id. at 2-7. 
154 See supra notes 127, 128 and accompanying text. 
155 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 2-9. 
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157 One could argue that parents’ WTP for their children’s safety is partially a 
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are common to all car seats.159 Groups like Consumer Reports find that 
there are still variations in the safety levels of car seats that are 
available.160 For example, all car seats may protect the child in front 
and rear collision tests at thirty miles per hour, but some seats may 
provide protection in collisions at forty miles per hour while others 
may not. 
One car seat feature that has recently become popular is side 
impact protection (“SIP”).161 A car seat with SIP is supposed to 
provide protection for the child in the event of a side impact 
collision.162 The NHTSA does not currently regulate SIP, although 
Congress has ordered them to consider doing so.163 The European 
Union currently requires infant car seats to pass a side impact test.164 
To come up with a concrete estimate of WTP for child safety, data is 
collected on SIP in car seats designed for infants less than one year 
old. 
1. Willingness to Pay for Side Impact Protection 
Target and Toys “R”Us are two of the largest car seat retailers in 
the country. A sample of the car seats available on their websites in 
October 2011 resulted in 161 car seats, 68 of which provide SIP.165 
Table 1 shows average prices of the car seats, with a column for the 
entire sample, a column for seats with SIP, and a column for seats 
without SIP. Car seats with SIP have an average price of $181.92, 
while car seats without SIP have an average price of $129.20. 
                                                 
159 NHTSA, supra note 5, at 2. 
160 See Report on Infant Car Seat Safety, CONSUMER REPORTS (2011) (summary of 
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163 See generally NHTSA, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
164 Mathew L. Wald, Most Baby Car Seats Fail Basic Safety Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
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165 See infra Table 1. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Car Seat Prices 
 All Car Seats Seats with SIP Seats without SIP 
Average Price $160.1 $181.92 $129.20 
(Standard Deviation) (61.96) (60.93) (49.38) 
Sample Size 116 68 48 
The $52.72 difference in average prices between seats with and 
without SIP may not accurately reflect what parents are willing to pay 
for side impact protection because there may be other features that 
seats with SIP tend to have.166 Regression analysis can isolate the 
WTP for SIP by controlling for other variables.167 This type of 
regression is called hedonic analysis because it isolates certain features 
that are desirable to consumers.168 Control variables that may impact 
the price of the car seat include certain features: whether the seat has a 
rotating canopy, removable cushions, a detachable base, the maximum 
weight of the child, the store where it was purchased, and the top ten 
brands (in terms of number of car seat models available). These ten 
brands can be compared with the omitted category, which comprises 
brands that have less than three car seat models available at Target and 
Toys “R”Us. 
One would expect that seats with features like a rotating canopy 
and removable cushions would increase the convenience of the seat 
and command a higher price. In this hedonic regression, that should 
translate to positive coefficients on those variables. Consumers should 
be willing to pay for a higher maximum weight because children can 
use those seats for a longer period of time. SIP, the variable of interest, 
should have a positive coefficient showing that parents are willing to 
pay more for seats with a higher safety level. Since parents may well 
use brand as a proxy for quality, one would also expect brands to have 
a large impact.169 As reputation is very important in the child car seat 
market, companies invest in quality and in advertising.170 
                                                 
166 See infra Table 2 and additional discussion in the Technical Appendix. 
167 See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS 
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPRICIST’S COMPANION 16–18 (2008). 
168 ERWIN DIEWERT, HEDONIC REGRESSIONS: A CONSUMER THEORY APPROACH 
321 (Robert C. Feenstra & Matthew D. Shapiro eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 
2003), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9740. 
169 See generally Merrie Brucks et al., Price and Brand Name as Indicators of 
Quality Dimensions for Consumer Durables, 28 J. ACAD. OF MARKETING SCI. 
359, 359 (2000). 
170 Id. 
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Results show that parents are willing to pay $26.47 more for a seat 
with side impact protection, which is statistically significant with a 
high degree of confidence.171 Coefficients on other variables are either 
of the expected sign or statistically insignificant.172 There is strong 
evidence that brands play a large role in the car seat market. 
Table 2: Regression Results 
Variable Price Coefficient 
Side Impact Protection (SIP) 26.465*** 
 (8.484) 
Base (stay in car) -3.325 
 (14.800) 
Removable Cushions -2.428 
 (5.777) 
Rotating Canopy 8.294 
 (9.863) 
Max. weight of infant 4.888*** 
 (0.350) 






















Ordinary least squares regression; robust standard errors 
in parentheses. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
                                                 
171 This estimate is significant at the 1% level, meaning that one can say with over 
99% confidence that the coefficient on this variable is different from zero. A 
high level of confidence comes from a relatively large coefficient and small 
standard error. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 167, at 18 (describing 
statistical significance in regression analysis). 
172 See infra Table 2 and additional discussion in the Technical Appendix. 
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2. Risk Measure for Side Impact Collisions 
In 2009, the most recent year for which data is available, 430 
children under age five were killed in automobile collisions.173 
Assuming that injury rates are constant across the age distribution, 
about eighty-six children under age one are killed annually in vehicle 
crashes. Side impact collisions account for one-third of child vehicle 
fatalities.174 This means that about twenty-nine children under one are 
killed in side impact collisions each year.175 
To calculate a fatality rate, the number of deaths must be divided 
by the population that is at risk. There were 4.1 million children born 
in the United States in 2009, so these infants would be under one year 
old during the relevant time period.176 Since 92% of American 
households have at least one automobile, approximately 3.8 million 
infants are riding in automobiles.177 This implies a fatality rate from 
side impact collisions of eight per million for infants.178 
If side impact protection would save all of the children in these 
crashes, the $26.47 willingness to pay for SIP would imply a value of 
statistical life for children of $3.5 million.179 However, SIP is not 
likely to save all of the children involved in side impact collisions. A 
NHTSA study found that the cause of serious injury for children in 
side impact collisions was usually an intruding door surface, where 
“increased padding . . . within the [child restraint system] might have 
                                                 
173 NHTSA, FATALITY ANALYSIS REPORTING SYSTEM ENCYCLOPEDIA (2011), 
available at http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/peopleallvictims.aspx. This 
statistic is the sort of thing that could prompt a parent to spend extra money on a 
car seat with side impact protection. 
174 Beata Mostafavi, Child Car Seat Designed for Side Impact Crashes, THE FLINT 
JOURNAL (Dec. 20, 2009), available at http://articles.southbendtribune.com
/2009-12-20/news/26746752_1_car-seat-side-impact-booster-seats.htm. 
175 See infra Technical Appendix for additional risk data. 
176 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 60 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 2 
(2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_01.pdf. 
177 See DEP’T OF TRANS., HOUSEHOLD, INDIVIDUAL, AND VEHICLE 
CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2011), available at http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita
.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/highlights_of_the_2001_national_household
_travel_survey/pdf/entire.pdf. 
178 29 Fatalities divided by 3.8 million infants = 0.0000076. 
179 $26.47 / 0.0000076 = $3,482,301. See infra Technical Appendix for additional 
information. 
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mitigated the severity of the injury sustained.”180 The International 
Standards Office (“ISO”) performed a study on side impact collisions 
to recommend testing procedures.181 The ISO study found that door 
intrusion in the rear seats averages 170mm to 280mm in depth with a 
velocity of seven meters per second to thirteen meters per second.182 
With this range of depth and velocity of door intrusion, car seats that 
meet side impact specifications set by the European Union protect 
children in approximately one quarter of these crashes.183 If SIP can 
protect one quarter of the twenty-nine children who are in potentially 
fatal side impact collisions, this implies a value of statistical life for 
children of $13.9 million.184 
While a VSL of almost $14 million is within the range of VSL 
estimates, it is at the high end of this range. A high estimate could be 
due to several factors. Since most VSL estimates are based on WTP 
for adult safety, I argue that the higher estimate for a child VSL 
reflects a WTP a premium for child safety. However, it could also be 
that the high VSL estimate is a product of idiosyncratic features of the 
infant car seat market, or the relatively small sample used. 
B. Existing Evidence 
1. Organic Baby Food 
Parents make many other market decisions that impact the safety 
of their children.185 Many parents choose to buy organic baby food for 
their children because they believe it is healthier and less risky.186 
Organic food presumably does not contain artificial pesticide residues 
that may be present in small quantities in food made from 
                                                 
180 LINDA MCCRAY, ET AL., NHTSA, INJURIES TO CHILDREN ONE TO THREE YEARS 
OLD IN SIDE IMPACT CRASHES 14 (2010), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv20/07-0186-W.pdf. 
181 See HEIKO JOHANNSEN, ET AL., REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISO SIDE 
IMPACT TEST PROCEDURE FOR CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS 3 (2007), available 
at www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv20/07-0241-W.pdf. 
182 Id. at 4–5. 
183 Id.; see also infra Technical Appendix for additional information. 
184 See infra Technical Appendix for additional information. 
185 For example, parents choose not only car seats, but also cars partially based on 
the safety implications for their children. Purchases of strollers, toys, and infant 
formula also have implications for child safety. 
186 Kelly B. Maguire, et al., Focus on Babies: A Note on Parental Attitudes and 
Preferences for Organic Babyfood, 24 J. AGRIBUSINESS 187 (2006). 
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conventionally grown crops.187 EPA economists Maguire, Owens, and 
Simon use a hedonic model similar to that above to calculate that 
parents are willing to pay an additional $.03 to $.04 per ounce for 
organic baby food.188 The authors perform a series of focus groups to 
measure perceived riskiness of conventional baby food compared to 
organic baby food.189 They find that parents believe conventional food 
results in a risk of cancer that is between one per million and eight per 
million higher than the risk from organic baby food.190 This subjective 
risk belief closely aligns with the actual risk of two per million as 
measured by USDA and FDA data on child fatalities.191 Using the 
willingness to pay and risk measures for organic baby food results in a 
child VSL of $9 million.192 
2. Asthma Medicine 
Parents who have children with asthma decide what medicines to 
buy to prevent a potentially fatal asthma attack.193 Professors 
Blomquist, Dickie, and O’Conor use information from a stated-
preference survey to determine how much parents are willing to pay 
for a hypothetical asthma medicine that could improve safety for 
people of various ages.194 The estimated VSL from this data is $14.1 
million for children and $8.0 million for adults.195 
3. Bicycle Helmets 
Not all evidence points to a higher VSL for children than adults.196 
Professors Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins use data from a stated-
preference study to determine the annualized cost of owning and using 
                                                 
187 Id. 
188 Kelly B. Maguire, et al., The Price Premium for Organic Babyfood: A Hedonic 
Analysis, 29 J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 132, 147 (2004). 
189 Maguire, et al, supra note 186 at 192. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Maguire et al., supra note 188. $.03–$.04 per ounce is multiplied by the average 
annual consumption of organic baby food in the sample to arrive at $18 x 
2/million = $9 million. 
193 Blomquist et al., supra note 117, at 421. 
194 Id. at 422. 
195 Id. at 412, 421. 
196 Jenkins et al., supra note 117, at 406–407. 
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a bicycle helmet.197 When combined with data from the Centers for 
Disease Control on bicycle-related fatalities, this number can be used 
to estimate a child VSL of $2.7 million and adult VSL of $4 million.198 
Although this estimate does not support a child premium, the study 
was based on stated-preference as opposed to market data and relied 
heavily on assumptions about the opportunity cost of time used to 
buckle the bicycle helmets.199 The market data on child car seats and 
organic baby food is more reliable and is supported by the other stated-
preference data on asthma medicine.200 
Although not all evidence points in the same direction, there is 
strong empirical support for a child VSL in the range of $9 million to 
$14 million. The lower and upper points of this range come from 
estimates derived from revealed-preferences in the market, which is 
the Handbook’s preferred methodology.201 Evidence from stated-
preference surveys is more ambiguous. 
V. SOLUTION: IMPLEMENTING A CHILD PREMIUM 
The above theoretical arguments and empirical evidence point 
toward a social desire to put a premium on the lives of children. As 
mentioned in Section II, most estimates of a value of statistical life for 
adults are around $7 million.202 These estimates are based on revealed 
preferences in the labor, car, and housing markets.203 The hedonic 
regression methodology used here is very similar to that used in the car 
and housing markets.204 The estimates of child VSL are roughly one 
                                                 
197 Id. at 401. 
198 Id. at 404. 
199 See generally id. at 402 (describing the costs of bicycle helmets as a 
combination of the purchase price and the opportunity cost of the time spent 
buckling the helmet, which is estimated to equal two-thirds of the respondent’s 
wage rate). 
200 See NOAA, supra note 105, at 6–10 (pointing out weaknesses of stated-
preference methodology). 
201 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 4-5 to 4-6. 
202 Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 113, at 26. 
203 Id. at 31. 
204 Id. at 31. 
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and a half to two times that of adults, so agencies should measure 
benefits of child safety in a way that reflects this premium.205 
Agencies can do this by using a multiplier on the VSL for children 
who are predicted to be saved by a regulation. The range of child VSL 
and adult VSL differ by a factor of one and a half to two, so this range, 
or any point in it, could be supported by an agency engaged in 
regulation of activities or products that impact child safety.206 This will 
increase the estimated benefits of proposed regulations by adjusting 
benefit measures to more accurately reflect the social desire to save 
children, as expressed in E.O. 13,405 and the EPA’s Handbook.207 By 
better reflecting society’s preferences for child safety, agencies will be 
better fulfilling their obligation under Executive Order 13,563 to 
“quantify . . . benefits [of health and safety] as accurately as 
possible.”208 
If an agency decides to use a child premium when conducting a 
cost-benefit analysis, they must decide who qualifies as a “child” for 
purposes of the child premium. The revealed-preference estimates 
above both deal with infants. Should teenagers be treated in the same 
way? Agencies have discretion to use their expertise when making this 
sort of decision.209 In many situations, it seems appropriate to include 
more than infants in the category that qualifies for a child premium. A 
default rule might be that people under the age of majority, which is 
usually eighteen, are the appropriate population to qualify for the child 
premium. This rule has the benefit of clarity. An alternative approach 
could be to use common law concepts to determine who should be 
considered a child. For example, for the tort of negligence, children 
under five years old are usually not expected to exercise care.210 
                                                 
205 The low end of the child VSL range leads to a child premium factor of $9 
million / $7 million adult VSL =1.29. The upper end of the child VSL range 
leads to a factor of $14 million / $7 million = 2. This range is rounded and 
shortened to one and a half to two for ease of implementation. 
206 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
CIRCULAR A-4, at 31 (2003). 
207 Exec. Order No. 13,045, sec. 1-101(b), 62 Fed. Reg. 19885 (Apr. 21, 1997). 
208 Exec. Order No. 13,563, sec. 1(c), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
209 See Entergy Corp v. Riverkeeper, Inc. 556 U.S. 208, 212 (2009) (holding that 
agency deserved deference for reasonable assumptions made about the 
economic analysis of proposed regulations). 
210 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 15 (2d ed. 
2002). 
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Children above five years are held to a “reasonable child” standard.211 
There is no individual conduct to hold to a reasonable standard in a 
regulatory setting, but an agency could determine whether children 
above a certain age could be expected to exercise care, such as engage 
in a defensive activity like letting tap water run before drawing 
water.212 A rule like this may better reflect who society feels needs 
extra protection from danger, but would make implementation more 
difficult for agencies and add uncertainty to the regulatory 
environment. 
If NHTSA were to use a multiplier of two when considering what 
to require for side impact protection in car seats, that would double the 
benefits of the proposed regulation.213 This would make it more likely 
for the agency to choose a higher level of safety, and for the proposed 
rule to pass a cost-benefit analysis and be approved by the Office of 
Management and Budget. This can help correct market failures in the 
car seat market and prevent infant deaths. Likewise, the EPA can use a 
child benefit multiplier when deciding on regulations that impact child 
safety, like the appropriate national standard for low-level ozone. 
A. Alternative Approaches 
Another way to place a benefit on the lives of children is to use a 
value of statistical life-year (VSLY) instead of a VSL.214 A VSLY 
takes evidence of willingness to pay for safety and translates it to a 
measure of value for an additional year of life.215 This implicitly leads 
to a premium on saving the lives of children, who have high life 
expectancies.216 The theoretical arguments in Section III directly 
support a VSLY approach in that benefits can be directly tied to the 
                                                 
211 Id. at 106. 
212 Letting tap water run before drawing tap water drastically reduces the 
concentration of lead compounds, which usually enters water from old 
plumbing. See HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 2-2 (describing efforts that can 
mitigate damages caused by lead in tap water). 
213 Since all of the benefits from this regulation come from improvements in child 
safety, the multiplier on child safety acts to increase the benefit estimate by one 
and a half to two depending on what multiplier the agency chooses. For 
regulations that have a mix of benefits to adults and children, only the benefits 
that accrue to children are increased with the multiplier. 
214 Sunstein, supra note 138, at 205. 
215 See id. at 231. 
216 Id. at 208. 
2013 Protecting the Innocent 297 
high life expectancy and expected improved standards of living for 
children. However, empirical evidence does not seem to support a 
VSLY approach, which assumes that the benefit of saving a life will 
decrease in an almost linear fashion.217 Although the high child VSL 
values in Section IV combined with the inverted-U shape found by 
Professors Viscusi and Aldy would suggest a decreasing function, a 
linear approximation does not seem the best fit.218 
B. Controversial Extension: Senior Discount 
Although the VSLY approach captures much of the rationale 
behind a child premium, it comes with a controversial impact on the 
other end of age spectrum – senior citizens.219 A VSLY approach 
means that the lives of senior citizens are valued at a fraction of the 
life of a middle-aged person, and a small fraction of the life of a 
child.220 Again, the theoretical arguments in support of a child benefit 
seem to support a discount for senior citizens.221 However, as 
mentioned above, empirical estimates of VSL show a slow downward 
trend after their peak at age forty-five, but do not resemble a steep 
linear decline that is implied with a VSLY approach.222 If senior 
citizens seem to be willing to pay a significant amount for their own 
safety, then it seems unreasonable for agencies to discount the benefits 
of that safety. 
Since there appears to be a mismatch in theory and empirical 
evidence, this is an area ripe for further research. This is especially 
true considering that some other countries do discount benefits of 
saving the lives of senior citizens; some agencies in the United 
Kingdom have used a multiplier of .59 and European Union agencies 
have used a .7 discount factor on the lives of senior citizens in benefit 
calculations.223 
                                                 
217 Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 115, at 579. 
218 Id. at 580. 
219 Sunstein, supra note 138, at 208–09. 
220 Id. at 222–23. 
221 Id. at 214. 
222 Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 115, at 574. 
223 See generally Aldy &Viscusi, supra note 113. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
There is theoretical and empirical support for putting a premium on 
the lives of children when agencies measure benefits for regulations 
that improve safety. Children have a long life expectancy with an 
increasing standard of living. They have not made choices to put 
themselves in risky situations, so they are generally considered 
innocent in life-threatening situations. Empirical evidence from the car 
seat market shows that parents are willing to pay a premium for the 
safety of their children. This high willingness to pay is consistent with 
other estimates of a child VSL in the range of $9 million to $14 
million. Current estimates of adult VSL center around $7 million, 
indicating that a premium of one and a half to two should be put on the 
lives of children who are expected to be saved by regulations. 
The President can mandate the use of a child premium by issuing 
an executive order to update Executive Order 13,045. An executive 
order would have the benefit of creating predictable, uniform 
economic analysis regarding child safety in all executive federal 
agencies. However, the President would likely face political pressure 
from the opposing party, interest groups, and perhaps agencies 
themselves if he were to require the use of a child premium. Agencies 
should not wait until they are ordered to use a child premium, but 
should instead choose to use a child premium as the best way to reflect 
the preferences of society and to follow the law as expressed in E.O. 
12,866. This note shows agencies that the choice of how to measure 
benefits of child safety is within their realm of discretion and that there 
is sufficient evidence to back up a child-specific measure of one and a 
half to two times that of adult VSL estimates. 
A child premium will help protect children through safety 
regulations promulgated by agencies like the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and 
the Environmental Protection Agency. It is normatively desirable to 
encourage this type of regulation because people consistently display a 
desire to increase safety for children, but many products and activities 
that impact child safety are either not traded on markets or are sold in 
markets that exhibit failures. Without well-functioning markets, 
parents and other altruistic adults are often unable to get the level of 
child safety that they desire. Regulation can help correct these market 
failures and ensure that our children will enjoy long and rich lives. If 
agencies adopt a child premium, there will be more rules to protect 
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against tragedies like Anton’s death and the mass shooting at Sandy 
Hook Elementary. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
Willingness to Pay Measure 
The hedonic analysis in Section IV largely follows the standard 
VSL estimation techniques in the economics literature.224 The 
estimated VSL from a regression like this is actually a lower bound on 
the WTP for a safety feature, as some of the purchasers may have been 
willing to pay significantly more for SIP.225 
To determine whether a car seat included SIP, information was 
gathered from the websites of the stores selling the seats as well as the 
websites of the car seat manufacturers. Car seats that were advertised 
as including SIP by either of the stores or the manufacturer were coded 
as one. This methodology was intended to mimic the information 
gathering process that parents would go through when deciding which 
car seat to buy. Other features, such as rotating canopy and maximum 
occupant weight, were ascertained in the same way. 
One way that this note’s hedonic analysis differs from the standard 
methodology in the literature is that the data points on car seats were 
gathered from website sales offers, not from actual sales data. Sales 
data are preferred because they reflect actual equilibrium points where 
buyers and sellers have agreed to an exchange.226 A website may offer 
items for sale that no one is purchasing, which could lead to 
overestimation of WTP for a safety feature like SIP. For proper 
inference, one must assume that at least some consumers are 
purchasing each of the car seats offered on the websites of Target and 
Toys ‘R Us. To check this assumption, the hedonic regression was run 
with the observations restricted to the top half of the sample when 
sorted by “best sellers” on the websites. Results were very similar, 
although the statistical significance of the coefficient on SIP dropped 
to a lower confidence level of 10%.227 
                                                 
224 See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 113, at 2–4 (surveying VSL literature). 
225 Jenkins et al., supra note 117, at 340. 
226 Sales data has the additional benefit of adding many observations which weighs 
the results based on popularity and gives the regressions much more statistical 
power. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 167, at 70 (discussing statistical 
power in regression analysis). 
227 Id. (By cutting the number of observations in half from 116 to 58, it is not 
surprising that the significance level drops from 1% to 10%. Results available 
upon request). 
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Willingness to pay estimate for side impact protection: $26.47. 
Risk Measure 
A 2009 NHTSA study shows that most child fatalities in side 
impact collisions result from head injuries, mostly due to door 
intrusion.228 A report commissioned by the ISO finds that door 
intrusion in rear seats averages 170mm to 280mm in depth with a 
velocity of seven meters per second to thirteen meters per second.229 
According to the ISO report, this would protect children in twenty-
seven percent of side impact collisions.230 With a statistical error of 
plus or minus three percent, one-quarter is within this estimate, and is 
used in this paper.231 Use of twenty-seven percent instead of one-
quarter results in a child VSL estimate that is within the suggested 
range. 
Baseline risk measure: 29 fatalities / 3.8 million infant riders = 
.000007632. 
Risk measure with SIP: (29 fatalities – 1/4 * 29 saved by SIP) / 3.8 
million = .000005724. 
VSL Calculation 
To calculate the VSL, the WTP estimate is divided by the change 
in risk due to SIP. 
Model: WTP / (Baseline risk - risk with SIP) = VSL 
VSL: $26.47 / (.000007632 - .000005724) = $13,873,165 
                                                 
228 NHTSA, supra note 188, at 4. 
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